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A SLIP OF THE TONGUE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
PLACED AIRLINE IMMUNITY IN THE CLOUDS
CHASE COBERN*
N RESPONSE TO THE most catastrophic breach of air trans-
portation security in U.S. history, Congress created the Trans-
portation Security Administration (TSA) to "receive, assess and
distribute intelligence information related to transportation se-
curity."1 Seeking to "encourage[ ] airline employees to report
suspicious activities" to the TSA, Congress granted airlines im-
munity from civil liability arising from such reports.2 As an ex-
ception, immunity is not extended to airlines for statements
"made with actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inac-
curate, or misleading" or "made with reckless disregard as to the
truth or falsity of that disclosure. '3 Interpreting this provision in
Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper,4 the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether Congress, in using terms "borrowed" from free
speech precedent, meant to adopt the accompanying First
Amendment "cluster of ideas" for purposes of Aviation and
Transport Security Act (ATSA) immunity.5 Holding that it did,
the Court invoked the standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan6
* Chase A. Cobern,J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2016; MAcc,
Abilene Christian University, 2013; BBA Accounting with High Honors, Abilene
Christian University, 2012. I would like to thank my wife and best friend, Rachel,
for her unconditional love and support.
I Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101,
115 Stat. 597 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1) (2012)).
2 ATSA§ 125 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44941) (capitalization and boldface type
omitted).
3 Id.
4 134 S .Ct. 852 (2014).
5 Id. at 861.
6 See 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964) (requiring "actual malice"-a statement
made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not").
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and its progeny,7 bolstering immunity for airlines absent a show-
ing a report was "materially false."8
Having answered the question it granted certiorari to decide,
the majority then proceeded to reach beyond its scope of review
by applying the standard as a matter of law,9 rather than follow-
ing its usual practice of remanding fact-intensive questions back
to the lower court.10 The allocation of the "materiality" determi-
nation underlying airline immunity-whether for judges, as the
majority's application might imply, or for juries, as the stan-
dard's precedent expresses-is of critical importance for future
cases involving false or misleading reports to the TSA. In exam-
ining the legal and practical implications of the Supreme
Court's overreach, this note argues that Hoeper threatens the
jury's vital role as the arbiter of credibility in an area deserving
of its deference-the uniquely sensitive context of post-9/11 air
transportation security.
William Hoeper was a pilot for Air Wisconsin Airlines Corpo-
ration, but after six years of flying, the airline ended flights from
his home base on all aircraft for which he was certified.1' Thus,
to continue flying for Air Wisconsin, Hoeper needed to gain cer-
tification to fly a new aircraft.' 2 After failing on three attempts to
certify, Hoeper was granted a "Last Chance Agreement" by Air
Wisconsin, in which he understood he would likely lose his job if
he failed again.1 3 On his fourth attempt, Hoeper performed
poorly in a flight simulation and angrily accused his instructor
of "railroading the situation."" The instructor later called the
airline's fleet manager, Patrick Doyle, to discuss the incident,
relaying that Hoeper had "blown up" and was "very angry."15
Doyle then booked Hoeper a flight home and contacted the
See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) (actual malice
requires falsity); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991)
(falsity must be material).
8 See Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 861.
9 See id. at 864.
10 See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 654 (2010) (acknowledging "the pru-
dence, when faced with a[ ] ... fact-intensive inquiry, of allowing lower courts to
undertake it in the first instance").
11 See Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 858.
12 Id.
13 See Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper (Hoeper I), 320 P.3d 830, 844 (Colo.
2012) (en banc).
14 See Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 858.




TSA.16 In the ensuing defamation action, a Colorado jury found
that Doyle told the TSA that Hoeper "may be armed," the airline
was "concerned about his mental stability and the whereabouts
of his firearm," and an "[u] nstable pilot.., was terminated to-
day."17 Hoeper was in fact authorized as a Federal Flight Deck
Officer to carry a firearm "while engaged in providing air trans-
portation,' 8 but he was not authorized to carry a firearm on the
flight to and from his testing location. 19 In response to Doyle's
report, the TSA ordered Hoeper's plane back to its gate and
sent officers aboard to seize him, only to find after questioning
that he was not carrying a firearm.20 Hoeper was permitted to
board a later flight and was fired by Air Wisconsin the following
day. 2 1
Hoeper sued Air Wisconsin in Colorado state court for defa-
mation, among other claims.2 Raising immunity under the
ATSA, Air Wisconsin moved for summaryjudgment and later for
directed verdict, but was denied twice by the trial judge who
ruled that "the jury was entitled to find the facts pertinent to
immunity. '2 The trial judge instructed the jury to allow
Hoeper's case to go forward if he had proved the airline made a
§ 44941 (b) disclosure,24 but did not state the provision protects
disclosures that are "materially true.21 5 The jury found for
Hoeper and later awarded him $1.2 million on his defamation
claim.26 On appeal, Air Wisconsin "primarily assert[ed]" that the
trial judge erred in submitting the immunity question to the
jury.27 Noting a circuit split on the "allocation of decision-mak-
16 See Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 858-59.
17 See id. at 859.
18 ATSA, Pub. L. No. 107-71, §126, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (codified as amended
at 49 U.S.C. § 44903 (2012)).




23 See id. at 859-60.
24 See 49 U.S.C. § 44941 (b) (2012) (removing immunity for disclosures "made
with actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading" or
"made with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure").
25 See Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 860.
26 See id.
27 See Hoeper v. Air Wis. Airlines Corp. (Hoeper 1), 232 P.3d 230, 233 (Colo.
App. 2009).
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ing between judge and jury" for immunity in other contexts,28
the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that where
ATSA immunity turns on disputed issues of material fact, the
question should be submitted to the jury.29 An en banc Colo-
rado Supreme Court disagreed, declaring ATSA immunity a
question of law and allowing judges to "make necessary findings
of fact relevant to the determination."" ° The state's high court
performed an exhaustive analysis of Doyle's individual state-
ments, ultimately finding, as did the jury, that Air Wisconsin was
not entitled to immunity. 1 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve "whether ATSA immunity may be denied
under § 44941 (b) without a determination that a disclosure was
materially false. '3 2 After answering this question in the negative,
the majority applied the material falsity standard to Doyle's re-
port, ultimately restoring the airline's immunity and reversing
the jury verdict repeatedly upheld by the Colorado courts.33
All nine justices agreed Congress "adopt[ed] the cluster of
ideas that were attached to each borrowed word" from Sullivan
and its progeny, and had thus meant to remove ATSA immunity
only for materially false statements.3 4 Drawing on defamation
case law to define speech not protected by the First Amend-
ment, the Court explained that "[m]inor inaccuracies" are in-
sufficient where "the substance, the gist, the sting, of the [report
is] justified. ' 35 A statement is not materially false unless it pro-
duces a different effect on the mind of the "relevant listener"
than the "truth would have produced. '3 6 In the ATSA context,
the Court identified a "reasonable TSA officer" as the relevant
listener, and defined the test as whether "a reasonable [TSA]
officer would consider [the falsehood] important in determin-
ing a response to the supposed threat."3 "
28 See id. at 237 n.6 (noting that the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
"have permitted [immunity] to go to juries," while the First, Fourth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits "reserve [the question of immunity] for the court").
29 See id. at 236.
30 See id.
31 Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper (Hoeper I), 320 P.3d 830, 837-40 (Colo.
2012) (en banc).
32 Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 858.
33 Id. at 864.
34 Id. at 861-62 (quoting FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 (2012)).
35 Id. at 861 (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517
(1991)).
36 Id. at 863.
37 Id. at 864-65.
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Drawing a partial dissent, the majority went on to "apply the
material falsity standard to the facts. '3 8 Stating it recognized "the
prudence ... of allowing the lower courts to undertake a fact-
intensive inquiry," the majority reasoned that "the need for clear
guidance on a novel but important question of federal law...
weighs in favor of our applying the ATSA immunity standard."' 9
Despite its decision to apply the standard, the majority ex-
pressed it was not taking a position on who is to apply the stan-
dard underlying ATSA immunity.40 Not ignoring the issue
altogether, however, the majority stated that "even if a jury were
to find the historical facts in the manner most favorable to
Hoeper, Air Wisconsin is entitled to ATSA immunity as a matter
of law."'41 The majority's analysis consisted of applying the mate-
rial falsity standard to each of Doyle's individual statements.42
Emphasizing the ambiguity of phrases such as "mentally unsta-
ble," the majority reasoned that legal connotations of the
phrase, which include "people suffering from serious mental ill-
nesses," is "hardly the only manner in which the label is used."4
In closing, the majority opined that if such "slips of the tongue"
could remove airline immunity, "no airline would contact the
TSA" without "the hesitation that Congress aimed to avoid. 44
In light of Congress's clear intention of encouraging reports
to the TSA, the Supreme Court properly bolstered airline immu-
nity with the "breathing space" afforded by the First Amend-
ment.45 However, the Court failed to resolve a fundamental
threshold issue and compounded this error by reaching out to
decide a fact-intensive inquiry as a matter of law.46 As a result of
38 Id. at 864.
39 Id. at 863 n.4.
40 Id. at 864.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 864-67.
43 Id. at 866.
44 Id.
45 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (noting that
"inevitable" erroneous statements "must be protected if the freedoms of expres-
sion are . . .to survive").
46 The importance of first identifying who determines material falsity is per-
haps illustrated by the considerable attention the Court devoted to the issue at
oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, 23, 24-25, 28, 30-31, Air
Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 (2014) (No. 12-315) (Justice Breyer:
"Are we supposed to say that matters of truth or falsity are not for the jury?";
Justice Alito: "[A]re they [viz. the Colorado Supreme Court] right that in deter-
mining ATSA immunity the jury has no role?"; Justice Scalia: 'You're going to
give the jury those two instructions on materiality?"; justice Sotomayor: "I actually
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determining immunity, while also purporting not to take a posi-
tion on whether judges or juries should make such determina-
tions, the majority sent mixed messages to judges handling
airline immunity in future cases. As the following suggests, the
Hoeper Court's analysis epitomizes the legal and practical dan-
gers of excluding juries from ATSA immunity.
The Court's integration of the First Amendment and ATSA
was only piecemeal, as illustrated by the majority's omission of a
basic free-speech principle of materiality: deference to juries.
In the partial dissent joined by Justices Kagan and Thomas, Jus-
tice Scalia acknowledged that "materiality is the sort of mixed
question of law and fact that has typically been resolved by ju-
ries."48 Scalia defined the jury's role as "vital ... in the material-
ity inquiry," requiring "delicate assessments of the inferences a
reasonable [TSA officer] would draw from a given set of facts
and the significance of those inferences to him."49 Moreover,
these assessments typically include witness testimony,50 and
courts have long given deference to the jury's "opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses" and resulting credibility
judgments." This deference extends to the immunity context,
where a judge considering whether to grant summary judgment
to a defendant raising immunity "must adopt ... the plaintiffs
version of the facts" unless "no reasonable jury could believe
it."' 52 Even the United States as amicus curiae in support of Air
Wisconsin conceded that "[o]ur reading of the statute is that
[immunity] would be a question for the jury" and "[m] ateriality
would like your opinion.., on whether this is an issue for the court or the jury.";
Justice Kennedy: "Do I send the case to the jury?"; Justice Ginsburg: "Can we go
back to the 'who decides' question. I find it very confusing.... So who decides? Is
it .. .the court or the jury?").
47 For example, though the Court relied heavily on Masson v. New Yorker Maga-
zine, Inc. in defining "materiality," the majority left out Masson's accompanying
standard ofjudicial review: to determine whether "[a] reasonable jury could find
a material difference between the defendant's statement and the truth." See 501
U.S. 496, 522 (1991) (emphasis added).
48 See Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 868 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
- Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
50 For example, in Hoeper, the jury heard a former TSA Federal Security Direc-
tor testify that while Doyle's statements warranted a security response, "the actual
truth did not even warrant a call to TSA." See Brief for Respondent at 42 n.18, Air
Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 (2014) (No. 12-315).
51 See Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989).
52 See Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 868 (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-380
(2007)).
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is a mixed question of law and fact. We believe that also, it
should be submitted to the jury."53
Although the Court assured its standard "is an objective one,
involving the hypothetical significance of an omitted or misrep-
resented fact to a reasonable security official, 54 it neither pro-
vides, nor can it provide, any truly objective guideline for
assessing the significance of threats to airline security. As
pointed out in Hoeper's brief, a burden of proof encompassing
how the TSA would have responded had it known the truth is
likely an "impossible task," recognizing the agency's "need to
maintain secrecy regarding airline security operations."55 In-
deed, Congress authorized the TSA to prescribe regulations
prohibiting disclosure of "sensitive security information" it
deems "detrimental to transportation safety."56 Accordingly, the
agency expansively defines "sensitive security information" to in-
clude, among other things: "security programs," "any security in-
cident response plan," and "methods used to gather or develop
threat information."57 The United States likewise acknowledged
that the ATSA "should not be interpreted to require exploration
of [TSA] procedures in private litigation. '58 While both parties
in this case called former federal employees to testify as expert
witnesses concerning TSA procedures, the United States in-
formed the Supreme Court that such testimony was "not author-
ized and not necessarily accurate in describing TSA policy."59
Nevertheless, the majority presumed a judicial capability for
making objective findings from the perspective of a reasonable
TSA officer.
Moreover, by criticizing the dissent's use of legal connota-
tions, the majority eliminated yet another tool of judicial inter-
53 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 46, at 23.
54 See Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 864 (majority opinion).
55 Brief for Respondent, supra note 50, at 42.
56 49 U.S.C. § 40119(b)(1) (2012).
57 49 C.F.R. § 15.5 (2014).
58 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 27 n.5,
Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 (2014) (No. 12-315) (citing
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-295,
§ 525(d), 120 Stat. 1382 (2007)) (explaining that though Congress allows civil
litigants in federal court to access sensitive security information upon a showing
of "substantial need," this provision would likely not extend to ATSA immunity
cases).
59 See id.; cf. MacLean v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 714 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2290 (U.S. May 19, 2014) (deciding whether the
TSA may terminate federal employees for disclosing § 40119(b) (1) information,
even where such disclosures are made pursuant to whistleblower protections).
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pretation.6 ° The majority's own connotative analysis of Doyle's
statements, and concurrent rejection of connotations that "law-
yers and judges may in some contexts apply, '61 begs the ques-
tion: what makes the majority's application any exception? This
paradox leaves judges considering whether to determine materi-
ality in a conundrum: if they follow the majority's reasoning and
conduct their own connotative analysis of statements, they be-
come susceptible to criticism, under the same reasoning,62 sim-
ply because they are judges. To be sure, the majority fails to
identify any tool of legal analysis that would facilitate a judge's
own connotative analysis-that is, its own analysis-in place of a
jury's. 63
Assuming arguendo thatjudges had some objective method for
analyzing reports to the TSA, they would still face the amor-
phous task of analyzing a "disclosure" that is itself composed of
multiple, potentially false or misleading statements. 64 As Osit
points out, the majority oddly criticized the Colorado Supreme
Court for "parsing so finely the distinctions between .. .hypo-
thetical statements and the ones that Air Wisconsin actually
made," while conducting its own analysis by similarly testing Air
Wisconsin's statements individually.65 Judges who attempt to ap-
ply the standard will be forced to choose between testing indi-
vidual statements or, as illustrated by the partial dissent, testing
disclosures in their totality.66 As the conflicting opinions imply,
the choice of method could very well be outcome-determinative.
Finally, the majority's overreach threatens the role of the jury
in a context meriting its inclusion. Without clear guidance,
courts will be left to determine the allocation of decision-mak-
ing between judge and jury. On one hand, they might conclude
60 See Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 866.
61 Id.
62 See id. ("[I]t is irrelevant whether lawyers or judges might with the luxury of
time have chosen more precise words.").
63 See id. at 869 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that the majority "does not
even attempt to describe another usage, let alone one that would be a materially
accurate description of the facts of this case as a jury might find them").
64 See Steven L. Osit, If You See Something... Say Something Materially True: Air
Wisconsin v. Hoeper and Immunity Under the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act, 26 No. 4 AIR & SPACE Law. 1, 18 (2014) (noting that the differing methods of
analysis by the majority and dissent "demonstrate... the potential for reasonable
jurists to disagree in this assessment").
65 See id. (quoting Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 864-67 (majority opinion)).
66 See id. (quoting Hoeper, 134 S.Ct. at 870) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (analyzing
"circumstances [that] enhanced ... the likelihood that [a falsehood] would have
a material effect on the TSA's response").
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that since the Supreme Court incorporated First Amendment
safeguards into the ATSA, the corresponding precedent of those
safeguards, emphasizing deference to juries, must likewise ap-
ply. On the other hand, they might read the majority's applica-
tion of the material falsity standard as ostensibly enabling judges
to determine similar findings of fact. As the dissenters humbly
point out, the jury's role is designed to "inject a practical sense
that judges sometimes lack. ' 67 This practical sense is particularly
important in the context of air transportation security, where
private airlines enjoy immunity customarily reserved for public
entities.6" Moreover, deference to the jury's ability to judge the
credibility of threats is necessary to protect the civil rights of
those directly affected by false reports.69 False or misleading re-
ports due to post-9/11 zeal waste TSA resources and divert at-
tention from legitimate threats. While constitutional speech
protections undoubtedly encourage airlines to report legitimate
security threats to the TSA, these protections should not come
without scrutiny."v In sum, the Court's advent of the First
Amendment into the ATSA failed to preserve the jury's opportu-
nity to weigh in on the meaning and impact of speech in an area
deserving of its deference. Courts would do well to resolve this
issue by pulling airline immunity out of the clouds of judicial
interpretation and placing it back into reach of the jury.
67 Hoeper, 134 S.Ct. at 870 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2012) (listing exceptions to statutory waiver of
sovereign immunity).
69 Since 9/11, both airline employees and TSA agents have been heavily criti-
cized for a "surge in discrimination ...against passengers perceived to be of
Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian descent." Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Mar-
garet B. Kwoka, Title VI Disparate Impact Claims Would Not Harm National Security-
A Response to Paul Taylor, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 503, 513-14 (2009) (noting that
from 2001-2009, the Department of Transportation received 1,022 civil rights
complaints against U.S. airlines and the TSA received 1,080 against its
personnel).
70 See Nicholas Poppe, Discriminatory Deplaning: Aviation Security and the Constitu-
tion, 79J. AIR L. & CoM. 113, 146 (2014) (arguing that such scrutiny "would not
interfere with the legitimate safety concerns of [airlines]; rather, it would simply
ensure that such concerns were actually legitimate and not borne out of underly-
ing discriminatory animus").
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